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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court recently issued an opinion, 
Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, on the interplay between special 
education and disability discrimination law.1 The decision 
determines when claims under Title II of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
     †  Amy J. Goetz received her undergraduate and graduate degrees from the 
University of Minnesota and the University of Minnesota Law School, cum laude. She 
has worked in education law since 1995, first as a staff attorney with the Minnesota 
Disability Law Center, then as a complaint investigator at the Minnesota 
Department of Education, and has represented families in private practice since 
1999, currently at the School Law Center in St. Paul. Goetz is admitted to the 
Minnesota and Wisconsin state courts, the Minnesota federal court, the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court. Her background 
includes serving legal services clients in family law, child custody, adoption and 
foster care, housing, and government benefits. Goetz is also the proud parent of two 
beautiful adult children with disabilities. 
     †† Andrea Jepsen is an attorney with the School Law Center, a law firm 
focusing on the rights of students and families in education and school law disputes. 
Andrea has worked with people with disabilities since 1997 in a variety of roles, 
including as an early childhood special education service coordinator, and as a legal 
services provider working regularly in the courts and in administrative proceedings. 
1. 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017).
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(Section 504) must be exhausted in special education administrative 
hearings before filing suit in federal court under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).2 This decision provides some 
much needed clarification to an evolving understanding of how, and 
in what manner, federal special education and non-discrimination 
laws overlap but maintain separate, distinct, and significant viability 
as tools to protect students with disabilities.3  
This article first provides an overview of three special education 
and disability discrimination laws—the IDEA, Section 504, and the 
ADA.4 It next discusses the confusion administrative bodies and 
courts have had in applying these laws.5 The article then analyzes the 
Fry decision.6 Finally, the article discusses Fry’s apparent limitations.7 
II. SPECIAL EDUCATION & DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION LAWS
A. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
The IDEA offers federal funds to states in exchange for a 
commitment: to furnish a “free appropriate public education” 
(FAPE) to all eligible children, which includes special education and 
related services.8 A FAPE under the IDEA confers a substantive right 
to education tailored to meet a child’s unique needs and confers 
sufficient supportive services to permit the child to benefit from that 
education.9 Parents and a group of school officials together must 
craft an individualized education program (IEP) to document a 
personalized plan to meet the child’s educational needs.10 
Anticipating that parents and school representatives cannot 
always agree, the IDEA established administrative procedures to 
resolve disputes about any matter concerning the provision of a 
2. Id. at 746–48.
3. See id. at 755–58.
4. See infra Part II.A–B.
5. See infra Part II.C.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743, 748 (2017) (citing 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(1)(A) (2016)).
9. Id. at 748–49 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9), (26), (29)); Smith v. Robinson,
468 U.S. 992, 1010 (1984); Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. 
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203 (1982). 
10. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 749 (first citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II)(bb),
(d)(1)(B); then citing Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988)). 
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FAPE.11 Complaints must first be channeled into an administrative 
hearing process.12 This hearing is followed by an opportunity for 
judicial review.13 
B. Section 504 & the Americans with Disabilities Act 
“Important as the IDEA is for children with disabilities, it is not 
the only federal statute protecting their interests.”14 Two federal 
antidiscrimination laws also cover both adults and children with 
disabilities in public schools and other settings.15 First, Title II of the 
ADA forbids any “public entity” from discriminating based on 
disability.16 Second, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act17 applies 
the same prohibition to any federally funded “program or activity.”18 
Section 504 specifically requires public elementary and secondary 
schools to provide a FAPE to each qualified student with a disability, 
regardless of the nature or severity of the student’s disability.19 The 
Section 504 FAPE is accomplished by providing regular or special 
education and related aids and services to students with disabilities.20 
The aids and services must be designed to meet the individual 
educational needs of such students as adequately as the needs of 
students without disabilities are met.21  
The cornerstone of both Section 504 and the ADA is the 
guarantee of equality in participation, benefit, and opportunity for 
people with disabilities.22 Section 504 and the ADA demand 
reasonable accommodations and modifications to policies, practices, 
or procedures when necessary to avoid inequality and, by extension, 
11. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(1).
12. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 749 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6), (f)). The right to an
administrative hearing is broad, encompassing claims for violations of additional 
rights enumerated in the IDEA that are ultimately in service of the provision of a 
FAPE, including the rights to “the identification, evaluation, or educational 
placement of the child.”  20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). 
13. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 749 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A)).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2016); id.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2016); Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 749.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–32; Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 749.
19. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a) (2016).
20. Id. § 104.33(b).
21. Id.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 701(a)(6); MARGARET C. JASPER, LEGAL ALMANAC: THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT § 1:1, Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2012). 
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disability discrimination.23 Both statutes authorize individual redress 
for violations, including injunctive relief or monetary damages.24 
C. Confusion in Administrative Bodies & the Courts 
Section 504, passed in 1973, was almost immediately eclipsed by 
passage of the IDEA in 1975 (known at the time as the Education for 
All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EHA)).25 The United States 
Supreme Court considered the EHA’s special education protections 
and Section 504’s disability discrimination protections as two sides 
of the same coin of protection for students with disabilities,26 despite 
the statutes’ obvious differences in objectives and language.27 
Congress corrected that misperception by passing the Handicapped 
Children’s Protection Act of 1986, which resulted in the enactment 
of a provision in the EHA to allow for preservation of claims and 
administrative exhaustion.28 The preservation of claims and 
administrative exhaustion provision, codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) 
(“Section 1415(l)”), reads: 
Nothing in [the IDEA] shall be construed to restrict or 
limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under 
the Constitution, the [ADA], title V of the Rehabilitation 
Act [including Section 504], or other Federal laws 
protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except 
that before the filing of a civil action under such laws 
seeking relief that is also available under [the IDEA], the 
[IDEA’s administrative procedures] shall be exhausted to 
the same extent as would be required had the action been 
brought under [the IDEA].29 
23. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2016); Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 749; Alexander v. Choate,
469 U.S. 287, 299–300 (1985). 
24. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2016); Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 750.
25. See Mark C. Weber, The Transformation of the Education of the Handicapped Act:
A Study in the Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 349, 358–59 
(1990).  In 1990, Congress changed the EHA’s name to the IDEA. See id. at 350 n.3. 
26. See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984).
27. See id. at 1013 (“We conclude, therefore, that where the EHA is available to
a handicapped child asserting a right to a free appropriate public education, based 
either on the EHA or on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the EHA is the exclusive avenue through which the child and his 
parents or guardian can pursue their claim.”). 
28. The Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372,
100 Stat. 796. 
29. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2016).
4
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Despite its plain language, this provision has been the source of 
significant confusion in the body of administrative decisions and the 
courts.30 Specifically, the provision has caused confusion over when, 
and for what claims, the IDEA’s administrative proceedings must 
first be exhausted. This issue was not directly raised or clarified until 
the United States Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Fry.31 
For example, after the passage of Section 1415(l), courts 
continued to incorrectly apply the view that special education laws 
were the exclusive avenue through which children could challenge 
the adequacy of their education.32 As a result, protection for students 
with disabilities through the ADA and Section 504 remained unused 
for decades.33 In addition, some courts applied an almost impossible 
burden of pleading and proof as a prerequisite to bringing and 
maintaining claims of disability discrimination for school-aged 
30. See Peter J. Maher, Note, Caution on Exhaustion: The Courts’ Misinterpretation
of the IDEA’s Exhaustion Requirement for Claims Brought by Students Covered by Section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA but Not by the IDEA, 44 CONN. L. REV. 259, 275 
(2011) (describing the confusion over interpreting IDEA: “Although § 1415(l) 
grants parents the right to file civil actions based on other federal laws, such as 
Section 504/ADA, it requires that they must first exhaust the remedies available 
under IDEA’s administrative due process system if they are seeking relief that is also 
available under the IDEA. It is this qualification that courts have misinterpreted and 
misapplied.”). 
31. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 37 S. Ct. 743, 754–55 (2017).
32. Compare Polera v. Bd. Of Ed. of Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 288
F.3d 478, 488 (2d Cir. 2002) (“The fact that . . . [the plaintiff] seeks damages, in 
addition to relief that is available under the IDEA, does not enable her to sidestep 
the exhaustion requirements of the IDEA.”), and Charlie F. by Neil F. v. Bd. of Educ. 
of Skokie Sch. Dist. 68, 98 F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 1996) (reasoning that the plaintiff 
cannot avoid the IDEA exhaustion requirement by seeking monetary damages), 
abrogated by Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017), with W.B. v. Matula, 
67 F.3d 484, 494–96 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that since the plaintiff sought monetary 
damages, the IDEA exhaustion requirement was unnecessary), abrogated on other 
grounds by A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 486 F.3d 791, 802 (3d Cir. 2007), and Padilla 
ex rel. Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1 in City and Cty. of Denver, Colo., 233 F.3d 1268, 
1274–75 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding the plaintiff sought monetary damages to redress 
past physical injuries, and had “no complaints regarding her current educational 
situation,” so the IDEA exhaustion requirement was unnecessary). 
33. See Maher, supra note 30, at 275 (explaining that the Handicapped
Children’s Protection Act of 1985, which “grants parents the right to file civil actions 
based on other federal laws, such as 504/ADA, [and] requires that they must first 
exhaust the remedies available under IDEA’s administrative due process system if 
they are seeking relief that is also available under the IDEA[,]” has been 
“misinterpreted and misapplied”). 
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students.34 This included requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate 
educators acted with “bad faith” or “gross misjudgment” in order to 
correct or hold schools accountable for ADA and Section 504 
violations “based on educational services for disabled children.”35 
Other circuits have applied the same claim-razing standard to 
discrimination complaints regarding the education of disabled 
students.36 
This interpretation has allowed the courts to effectively tamp 
down fulfillment of the objectives of federal non-discrimination 
protections. Even though the United States Supreme Court 
questioned, but did not answer, whether Section 504 was intended 
to “reach only intentional discrimination,”37 other courts have 
continued to enforce this unreasonable standard of “bad faith and 
gross misjudgment.”38 
Over the past decade, disability discrimination claims under 
Section 504 and the ADA, which have maintained strong viability in 
housing, employment, and other settings, have slowly emerged from 
under the shadows of the IDEA’s special education jurisprudence. 
These claims have begun to reflect an appreciation for their unique 
and important role in civil rights protections for students with 
disabilities.39 Concurrent with this evolution, courts and hearing 
34. See id. at 283 (explaining how districts’ pleading requirements were
“forcing parents of IDEA students to repackage their Section 504/ADA claims solely 
as IDEA claims”). 
35. B.M. ex rel. Miller v. S. Callaway R-II Sch. Dist., 732 F.3d 882, 887 (8th Cir.
2013) (citing Birmingham v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 850, 856 (8th Cir. 2000)). 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently held that “[w]here alleged 
ADA and Section 504 violations are based on educational services for disabled 
children, the plaintiff must prove that school officials acted in bad faith or with gross 
misjudgment.” Id. (quoting Birmingham, 220 F.3d at 856). 
36. See, e.g., C.L. v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 826, 841 (2d Cir.
2014); G.C. v. Owensboro Pub. Schs., 711 F.3d 623, 635 (6th Cir. 2013); D.A. ex rel. 
Latasha A. v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 629 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 2010); Sellers 
by Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of City of Mannassas, 141 F.3d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1998). 
37. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295–97 (1985) (holding unequivocally
that Section 504 reached unintentional discrimination). 
38. See supra note 36. It is the authors’ hope that as the understanding that
special education protections do not subsume disability nondiscrimination 
protections continues to evolve, courts will reject a “bad faith and gross 
misjudgment” standard of proof in favor of a more rational standard. 
39. See Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2008) (demonstrating that
courts have begun to recognize the protections of the IDEA must not consume the 
protections of Section 504 and the ADA). The court in Mark H. concluded that the 
6
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officers have experienced a renewed confusion in determining 
when, and to what extent, the administrative hearing procedures of 
the IDEA must first be exhausted before pursuing non-IDEA claims, 
specifically ADA and Section 504 claims.40   
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions41 have provided some 
clarity to these questions. In short, this clarity will permit a greater 
appreciation of the gravity and distinction between the various 
disability discrimination protections for students. It will also reduce 
the cost, delays, and frequent errors of the IDEA administrative 
hearing process that present insurmountable barriers to justice for 
students with disabilities. 
III. THE FRY DECISION
Stacy and Brent Fry sued their local and regional school districts 
and school principal for violating the ADA and Section 504 by 
refusing to allow their daughter, E.F., to bring her trained service 
dog to kindergarten.42 E.F.’s service dog, Wonder, provided E.F. the 
IDEA provides clear congressional intent to preserve all remedies and rights under 
Section 504 and the requirements to provide a free appropriate public education in 
each law are “overlapping but different.” Id. at 925. More recently, in cases strongly 
supported by the United States Department of Justice, courts have strengthened the 
distinct viability of disability discrimination protections for special education 
students. See B.C. v. Mt. Vernon Unified Sch. Dist., 837 F.3d 152, 160 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(“Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence, therefore, shows disparate impact under the ADA 
and Section 504 only if, as a matter of law, a child with a disability under the IDEA 
necessarily qualifies as an individual with a disability under the ADA and Section 
504, such that Plaintiffs’ data on children with a disability under the IDEA suffice as 
data on individuals with a disability under the ADA and Section 504. We conclude 
that this is not the case.”); see also CG v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 734 F.3d 229, 235 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (“[C]ompliance with the IDEA does not automatically immunize a party 
from liability under the ADA”); K.M. v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 
1100–01 (9th Cir. 2013) (determining that compliance with the IDEA does not 
necessarily establish compliance with the ADA); D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 
675 F.3d 26, 42 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Compliance with the IDEA does not necessarily 
disprove a claim under the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA.”). 
40. See, e.g., Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863, 871 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“Non-IDEA claims that do not seek relief available under the IDEA are not subject 
to the exhaustion requirement, even if they allege injuries that could conceivably 
have been redressed by the IDEA.”), invalidated by Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 
1173 (9th Cir. 2014). 
41. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988
(2017); Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017). 
42. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 750–51.
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assistance E.F. required in daily activities due to her severe form of 
cerebral palsy.43 For example, Wonder was trained to perform such 
tasks as retrieving dropped items, helping E.F. balance when she 
used her walker, opening and closing doors, turning on and off 
lights, helping E.F. take off her coat, and helping E.F. transfer to and 
from the toilet so that her independence (and one assumes, her 
privacy and dignity) could be maximized.44 School officials refused 
to allow Wonder into school because a human aide was provided as 
part of E.F.’s IEP, and the school concluded this rendered Wonder’s 
services superfluous.45  
The Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) 
determined that the school district’s exclusion of Wonder violated 
E.F.’s rights under Title II of the ADA and Section 504.46 The OCR 
compared the school officials’ determination that Wonder’s services 
were superfluous to a student in a wheelchair who wished to 
independently enter a school building using a ramp over being 
carried into the building by assistants, or a blind student who 
preferred to use a cane over being led around by others.47 
The Frys then filed suit seeking declaratory relief and money 
damages to compensate for E.F.’s injuries, which included 
emotional distress and pain, embarrassment, and mental anguish.48 
The district court granted the school district’s motion to dismiss the 
suit.49 It held that Section 1415(l) required the Frys to first exhaust 
the IDEA’s administrative procedures.50 A divided panel of the Sixth 
Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Section 1415(l) applies whenever a 
plaintiff’s alleged harms are “educational” in nature.51 
The United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded the 
Sixth Circuit’s decision.52 The Court held that: (1) if, in a suit 
brought under a statute other than the IDEA, the remedy sought is 
not for the denial of a FAPE, then exhaustion of the IDEA’s 
procedures is unnecessary; and (2) courts should examine the 





48. Id. at 751–52.
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gravamen of the complaint to determine whether it seeks relief for 
the denial of a FAPE.53 In other words, when the crux of the 
complaint reveals that the remedy sought is for the denial of a FAPE, 
the IDEA administrative procedures must be exhausted before 
lawsuits are filed on ADA and Section 504 claims.54 
In coming to this conclusion, the Court in Fry re-traced the 
historical treatment by the Supreme Court and Congress of the 
interaction between the IDEA and the ADA and Section 504, 
beginning with Smith v. Robinson.55 The parents in Smith sought to 
secure a FAPE for their child under the IDEA as well as Section 504 
and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.56 The 
Court in Smith held “that the IDEA altogether foreclosed additional 
claims . . . [because] its ‘comprehensive’ and ‘carefully tailored’ 
provisions . . . [created] ‘the exclusive avenue’ through which a child 
with a disability (or his parents) could challenge the adequacy of his 
education.”57 The Fry Court noted that Congress quickly responded 
with the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, now 
codified at Section 1415(l), which “overturned Smith’s preclusion of 
non-IDEA claims while also adding a carefully defined exhaustion 
requirement.”58  
The Court in Fry recognized that Section 1415(l) preserves the 
distinct viability of non-IDEA claims such as the ADA and Section 
504, yet first funnels all claims for relief available under the IDEA 
through its administrative hearing process.59 To distinguish between 
claims that must be exhausted initially in an IDEA administrative 
hearing from claims that may be brought initially in the courts, the 
Court first identified that the IDEA’s primary purpose is the 
guarantee of a FAPE.60 As such, the Court held that Section 1415’s 
“exhaustion rule hinges on whether” the relief sought is an 
enforcement of the child’s right to a FAPE.61 If the relief sought is 
not redress for the failure to provide a FAPE, even though the 
actions that give rise to the student’s claims are related to the 
53. Id. at 746–47.
54. Id. at 747.
55. Id. at 746 (citing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984)).
56. Id. at 750 (citing Smith, 468 U.S. at 992).
57. Id. (quoting Smith, 468 U.S. at 1009).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 753.
61. Id. at 754.
9
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student’s education, the student need not exhaust the administrative 
procedures of the IDEA before bringing suit under separate and 
distinct laws such as Section 504 and the ADA.62 
The Court rightly observed that there are many reasons that a 
child might require an accommodation of her disability in an 
educational setting that have nothing to do with the provision of a 
FAPE.63 This includes where the ADA or Section 504 otherwise 
require the provision of a requested accommodation.64 Under both 
the ADA or Section 504, the school has an obligation to provide the 
requested accommodation.65 However, unless the accommodation is 
required in order to provide a FAPE under the IDEA, an 
administrative hearing officer has no authority to require the school 
to provide the requested accommodation.66 This is because the 
officer is only empowered to enforce the child’s substantive right to 
a FAPE.67 
Of course, the plaintiff is the master of her own claim.68 
However, the Court cautioned that a plaintiff’s artful pleading will 
not permit her to escape the administrative exhaustion requirement 
of the IDEA if she effectively seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE.69 
What matters is the essence of the relief sought, though notably, not 
the relief she “could have sought.”70 The plaintiff identifies the relief 
she seeks, and her claims are subject to exhaustion, or not, based on 
that choice.71 To identify whether a plaintiff seeks relief available 
under the IDEA, the Court urged lower courts to consider the 
“diverse means and ends” of the statutes that protect the rights of 
people with disabilities.72 In particular, the Court suggested 
considering the IDEA on the one hand, and the ADA and Section 
504 on the other.73 
The Court then explored a set of hypothetical questions 








69. See id. at 755.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 755.
73. Id.
10
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relief for the denial of a FAPE.74 These hypotheticals form a two-part 
test.75 First, could the plaintiff have brought the same claim if she 
was seeking access to a different kind of public facility?76 For 
example, what if E.F. had sought to bring Wonder with her to a 
public library?77 And second, could an adult in the school building 
bring essentially the same claim?78 Could a teacher, for example, 
complain that his rights under the law were violated because he was 
barred from bringing his service animal to his place of 
employment?79 If the answers to both questions are “yes,” then it is 
very unlikely that the student seeks relief for the failure to provide a 
FAPE.80 Therefore, the student need not first exhaust the 
administrative hearing requirements of the IDEA before her claims 
can be heard in court.81 
The Court acknowledged that the distinction between a claim 
that seeks redress for the failure to provide a FAPE and an 
equal-access claim may not always be obvious.82 For example, a 
wheelchair-bound student cannot receive a FAPE if she cannot enter 
a school building because it lacks a ramp.83 The core of this 
complaint would involve access rather than the denial of a FAPE.84 
The same type of complaint could stem from the student’s inability 
to enter a public library that lacked a ramp.85 Conversely, a student 
seeking remedial tutoring in order to gain equal access to a school’s 
regular education math curriculum could legally claim that the 
failure to provide such tutoring amounts to disability 
discrimination.86 However, an adult visiting the school could not 
bring such a claim.87 As such, the second student’s claim is one that 
is more like the denial of a FAPE.88 The second student would thus 












86. See id. at 756–57.
87. See id. at 757.
88. Id.
11
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be required to first exhaust the administrative procedures made 
available under the IDEA before bringing suit under disability 
discrimination statutes.89 These examples show that despite the 
helpful clarification in the Fry decision, the tools the Court has 
provided by way of these hypothetical questions may cause as much 
confusion as clarification. 
The Court suggested another tool that lower courts can use to 
establish the gravamen of the plaintiff’s complaint and the plaintiff’s 
corresponding obligation to first make use of the IDEA’s 
administrative hearing procedures: prior pursuit of the IDEA’s 
administrative remedies.90 The Court said this “will often provide 
strong evidence that the substance of a plaintiff’s claim concerns the 
denial of a FAPE, even if the complaint never explicitly uses that 
term.”91 In his concurrence in part and concurrence in the 
judgment, Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, refers to this 
additional standard as a “another false clue,” stating that it is “easy to 
imagine circumstances under which parents might start down the 
IDEA road and then change course and file an action under the ADA 
or the Rehabilitation Act that seeks relief that the IDEA cannot 
provide.”92 These circumstances could include where parents might 
be “advised by their attorney that the relief they were seeking under 
the IDEA is not available under that law but is available under 
another.”93 Or, “parents might change their minds about the relief 
that they want, give up on the relief that the IDEA can provide, and 
turn to another statute.”94 The authors agree with Justices Alito and 
Thomas that this “clue” involving prior pursuit of the IDEA’s 
administrative remedies, in particular, is likely to confuse lower 
courts and lead them astray.95  
IV. FUTURE UNCERTAINTY
Fry left unanswered two important questions that are likely to 
cause future confusion. First, because a FAPE under Section 504 
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receives a Section 504 FAPE when the student is provided with 
regular or special education, and related aids and services, that are 
designed to meet his or her individual educational needs as 
adequately as the needs of students without disabilities are met.96 A 
student’s rights under Section 504 are violated when a school does 
not provide an education that affords a student equal opportunity to 
obtain the same level of academic achievement when the student is 
in the most integrated setting appropriate to the student’s needs.97 
A student receives a FAPE under the IDEA when the student 
receives specially designed instruction and support services that are 
reasonably calculated to enable the student to make progress 
appropriate in light of the student’s circumstances.98 The IEP for a 
child who is fully integrated in the regular classroom should be 
“reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks 
and advance from grade to grade.”99 Regardless of the student’s 
particular circumstances, the student’s educational program must be 
appropriately ambitious in light of those circumstances.100 However, 
in Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. 
Rowley,101 and in Endrew F,102 the Court specifically rejected the idea 
that a FAPE under the IDEA is an education that aims to provide 
disabled children substantially equal opportunities as non-disabled 
children to achieve academic success, attain self-sufficiency, and 
contribute to society.  
The differing FAPE definitions and Fry’s holding leave unclear 
the answer to the following scenario. Assume a school district 
provides a student with an education that allows him or her to 
advance from grade to grade, and the school also provides that 
student with academic opportunities that are not equal to those 
provided to his or her peers without disabilities. That student’s claim 
will fail the Fry two-part test.103 If the student seeks relief under 
96. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b) (2016) (noting that in addition, schools must also
satisfy the requirements of 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.34, 104.35, and 104.36). 
97. 34 C.F.R. § 104.4(b)(vii)(2).
98. Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988,
999 (2017). 
99. Id. at 991.
100. Id. at 1000. 
101. 458 U.S. 176, 211 (1982). 
102. 137 S. Ct. at 999. 
103. See Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743, 746, 754 (2017) (holding 
that (1) “[I]f, in a suit brought under a different statute, the remedy sought is not 
for the denial of a FAPE, then exhaustion of the IDEA’s procedures is not required;” 
13
Goetz and Jepsen: Post-Fry Idea and Section 504: New Intersections and Detours
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2018
2018] The ADA, IDEA, Section 504 and the Fry Case 627 
Section 504 or the ADA, what is the student’s obligation to exhaust 
the administrative remedies? Under the plain language of Section 
1415(l) and the Court’s analysis thereof, the student should not be 
subject to the IDEA’s administrative exhaustion requirement 
because the student does not seek relief available from a hearing 
officer.104 But, despite clear statutory language, Fry’s imperfect test 
leaves room for one to argue that administrative exhaustion remains 
appropriate.105 
Second, the Court left for another day the question of whether 
exhaustion of IDEA’s administrative hearing procedures is required 
when the plaintiff complains of the denial of a FAPE under the 
IDEA, but seeks only monetary damages, a remedy not within a 
hearing officer’s ability to award in an IDEA due process hearing.106 
The Frys and the Solicitor General said the answer to that question 
is “no.”107 These authors agree. A plain language analysis of Section 
1415(l), as endorsed by the Supreme Court in Fry, makes any other 
conclusion unlikely. A plaintiff, as master of her claim, chooses 
monetary damages as the remedy she seeks. She is under no 
obligation to choose different relief that a hearing officer has the 
power to award in an administrative hearing under the IDEA, and 
no hearing officer may award her the damages she seeks. As such, 
under the plain language of Section 1415(l) and the plain language 
analysis employed by the Court in Fry, she should be free to bring 
her claims to the courts without first exhausting them 
administratively. 
and (2) “[E]xhaustion of the IDEA’s administrative procedures is unnecessary 
where the gravamen of the plaintiff’s suit is something other than the denial of the 
IDEA’s core guarantee of a FAPE”). 
 104. See id. at 754 (“[I]f, in a suit brought under a different statute, the remedy 
sought is not for the denial of a FAPE, then exhaustion of the IDEA’s procedures is 
not required. After all, the plaintiff could not get any relief from those procedures: 
A hearing officer . . . would have to send her away empty-handed.”). 
 105. Id. at 750 (“[A] plaintiff bringing suit under the ADA, the Rehabilitation 
Act, or similar laws must in certain circumstances – that is when seeking relief that 
is also available under the IDEA – first exhaust the IDEA’s administrative 
procedures.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
106. Id. at 752 n.4. 
107. Id. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Until the Supreme Court’s decision in Fry, there was significant 
confusion in administrative bodies and courts on the application and 
interaction of the special education and disability discrimination 
laws.108 Fry provided much-needed guidance on these laws and 
fashioned a two-part test for determining their interplay.109 Despite 
the test’s apparent limitations, students with disabilities, their 
parents, and their advocates have much to appreciate in the Court’s 
decision. The Court clarified the manner in which federal special 
education and non-discrimination laws overlap but maintain their 
separate and distinct viability.110  This clarification spares students 
who neither seek nor can obtain relief from a hearing officer under 
the IDEA from exhausting the IDEA’s administrative remedies.111 
While imperfect, Fry removes significant barriers for students with 
disabilities seeking to enforce their rights and therefore represents 
an important victory for students with disabilities.112 
108. See supra Part II. 
109. See supra Part III. 
110. See id. 
111. See id. 
112. See id. 
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